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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
KAMAS STATE BANK, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
-vs-
J. BUYS CUMMINGS and 
MARY CUMMINGS, et. al., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Appellants and Defendant~. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF. FACTS 
Case No.· 
9798 
For purpose of appeal we ~ccept the 
Statement of Facts set forth in Appellants• 
brief. 
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GENERAL RESPONSE TO 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
At the outset Respondent would like to 
make the following observation about 
Appellants• Brief: 
Th~re appears to be a general 'effort on 
the part of the Appellants in writing their 
brief to cloud the issues by making continued 
reference to matters that are wholly 
irrelevant and immaterial. 
First, Appellants refer, both directly 
and indirectly, to an insurance company. 
There is no insurance company, as a party, 
plaintiff or defendant, before the court 
and such references are wholly out of order 
and improper. 
Second, Appellants take the position 
that in the -commercial world third parties 
must look for and seek out the feelings of 
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all parties who are or might be affected by 
their acts. That is, third parties are 
bound to determine not only if parties are 
legally bound but must also see if they 
feel morally bound·. For example: 
"Respondent •••• ma'de no effort .••• to determine 
whether or not the Appellants felt they 
had a binding option ... In other words they 
are saying that Respondent is not to look 
to the law or precedent but to what each 
individual feels before_it can act and have 
the protection of the law. This in essence 
destroys the long es.tablished principal of 
Stare Decisis •. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE AGREEMENT IS NOT A TRUE OPTION BUT 
IN REALITY ONLY A RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION OR 
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OF FIRST REFUSAL. 
It is a well settled rule in this State 
as well as other jurisdictions that· the 
agreement on which the Defendants claim 
their priority of interest is not a true 
option but only the right of "pre-emption" 
or of "first refusal" and that until the 
Bourgeois decide to sell, no option springs 
into being. In Chournos vs. Ev~na I~vestme~t 
Company, 93 Pacific 2nd 450, 97 Utah 335, 
the Court states "An option to purchase may 
be defined as a contract by which an owner 
agrees with another person that he shall 
have the privilege of buying his property 
at a fixed price within a specified time. 
The land owner does not sell his land; he 
does not then agree to sell it; but he does 
then sell something,---viz., the right or 
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privilege to buy at the election, or option 
of the other party. The second party gets 
in praesenti, not lands, nor an agreement 
that he shall have lands, but he does get 
something of value; that is the r_ight ·to 
call for and receive lands if he elects ... 
In this case the Court held that the provision 
giving a person the first opportunity t~ 
purchase the land did not constitute an 
option. For the individual did not have 
the "right to call for and receive lands if -
he elected. 11 He only had this right after 
the owner decided to sell. Ip the case at 
hand until Bourgeois decided to sell, Mr. 
Cummings had no power to require him to do 
so. In Re Rigby's Estate, 167 Pacific 2nd 
964, Wyoming Case, 1946; J~mes On Option 
Contracts, Sections 101, 211, 212; Williston 
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On Contracts, Section 43, page 71, First 
Edition, Sectio~ 44, page 129 of Revised 
Edition; Restatement of Property, Section 
393, comment f, and Section 413, comment b. 
Until Mr. Bourgeois decided to sell, 
Mr. Cummings had no right or interest in 
the property and thus, when it became 
necessary for Mr. Bourgeois to borrow money 
on his property, the mortgagor, Kamas.State 
Bank, had a right to take a first lien upon 
the property which would be good against all 
other parties who might claim an interest in 
the future. This includes the interest of 
J. Buys Cummings which at most could spring 
into being only after Bourgeois decided to 
sell. After Mr. Bourgeois had found it 
necessary to mortgage his property, possibly 
he was estopped to offer it for sale 'until 
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the mortgage had been cleared. In the event 
it became necessary for Mr. Bourgeois to 
sell in order to avoid the foreclosure 
action, then it would be impossible to 
perform, and it would seem that the 
individual who held the first right of 
refusal could at most have an action against 
Mr. Bourgeois for damages. In James On 
Option Contracts, 504, Section 1104, we read 
as follows: "If d-uring the time he breaches 
~he option agreemeri_t by repudiating the 
option, or by placing himself in a position 
where it is impossible for him to perform, 
it would seem the optionee has an action to 
recover damages arising from· the breach of 
the option. 11 
In as much as J. Buys Cummings had only 
a "pre-emptive right" or "right of first 
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refusal" he had no immediate interest in 
the land and thus, the mortgage created a 
first lien on the property. In fact, he 
had no true option until ~ourgeois decided 
to sell •. 
II 
A RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION THAT ESTABLISHES 
A FIXED PRICE IS VOID. 
In Simes On Future Interests, pa·ge 347 ,· 
Section 102, we find the following under 
Pre-emption Conditions: 
"Suppose A conveys land to B in 
fee on the· express condition that B 
desires to sell he must first offer 
the land to A at the lowest price he 
is willing to accept from any other 
vendee. Or suppose the condition is 
that, if B desires to sell he must 
first offer the property to A at a 
fixed price, or at a price which is a 
percentage of, or lower than, he is 
willing to accept_ from anyone else •. 
In the second case, it may be said 
that this is merely a qualified 
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forfeiture restraint on a fee simple and 
should be held void. There is 
authority to that effect. On the other 
hand, in the first case, where the 
restraint is to the effect that the 
grantee will first offer the property 
to the grantor at the lowest price 
which he will accept from anyone else, 
it would seem that marketability is 
not, in fact, restrained at all. The 
owner can sell to his grantor or to 
anyone else in the world at any price 
which he desires. The only restriction 
is that he cannot prefer any other 
vendee over his grantor." 
Mr. Cummings' position clearly_ falls 
within the second dase which should be 
held void. It is clearly distinguishable 
from the case of Cummings et. ux. vs. 
Nielson et. al., 42 Utah 157, which is 
quoted by Appellants in their brief, the 
case of Cummings et. ux. vs. Nielson et. al. 
falling within first case which is valid as 
contrasted with the second which is void. 
In Brace vs. Black, 144 A 2nd 385, 51 
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. 
New Jersey Super. 572, we have a case 
wherein the facts are basically that there 
was a pre-emption agreement, whereby the 
land owner, should he decide to sell land, 
would give to the other party the right and 
option to purchase for a stated sum, such 
right to expire with death of the party. 
The Supreme Court in holding the right of 
option invalid reasoned as follows:. "The . 
first matter to be considered is the validity 
of the so called option, which is really a 
mere right .of refusal or right of pre-emption. 
The Court below held that the agreement was 
too vague and indefinite-to be inforcible · 
and that it was an unreasonable limitation 
on alienability. 
·"Restatement, Property I Section 413 (2) 1 
states: 
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'A promissory restraint or 
forfeiture restraint on the alienation 
of a legal estate in land which is in 
the form of a provision (a) that the 
owner of the estate shall not sell the 
same without first offering to sell to 
some designated person, •••• at a fixed 
price .••• is valid if, and only if, the 
restraint is valid under rules stated 
in Section 406-411.' 
"Section 404 thereof defines a promisso·ry 
restraint on alienation as an attempt by an 
otherwise effective conveyance or contract 
to cause a later conveyance to impose 
contractual liability on the one who makes 
the later Gonveyance when sue~ liability 
results from a breach of an a~reement not to 
convey. 
-"There is in the law a well-recognized 
policy of freedom of alienation of property. 
This is so embedded that restraints on 
alienation must be in some way justified in 
order to be upheld. In the Restatement under 
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Section 413, at page 2442, we find this 
illustration: 
'A owning Blackacre in fee simple 
absolute makes an otherwise effective 
conveyance there "to B and his heirs, 
and B covenants for himseif, his heirs, 
executors and assigns, that if C is 
still ~live, he will not sell -Blackacre 
without first offering Blackacre to C 
for $5000.00." Cis in being at the 
time of the conveyance. The promissory 
restraint is invalid.' 
In the comment under Section 413, _ 2 (a) , we 
find the following at page 2444: 
'When, by the terms Of the 
restraint, the price at which the 
estate must be offered to the designated 
person is fixed or is to be a certain 
percentage of a third party's offer, 
there is substantial _curtailment of 
the alienability of the land. A fixed 
price is usually set sufficiently low, 
in the light of possible developernenfs, 
to enable the designated person to 
reap the benefits of any increase in 
value .•.. the owner of the estate will 
--be deterred from attempting to sell his 
property because of the improbability 
that he will realize the full market 
value. This hindrance to alienation 
brings these provisions within the rules. 
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previously stated in Section 406-411.' 
.. Restatement, Property, Section 406, 
declares that a restraint on the alienation 
of a legal possessory estate in fee simple 
which is, or but fortherestraint would be, 
indefeasible is valid if, and only if, among 
other things the restraint is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
II . 
In a comment upon reasonableness 
under the foregoing section, at page 2407, 
various factors are set forth which mig~t 
tend to support the reasonableness o~ 
unreasonableness of a restraint. It is 
pointed out that these factors are not 
exhaustive and that •each case must be 
thoroughly examined in the light of all 
circumstances to determine whether the 
.objective sought to be accomplishe~ by the 
restraint is worth attaining at the cost of 
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interfering with the freedom of alienation 
or to determine whether the particular 
interference with alienability is so slight 
as not to be material.' 
... Restraints against alienation are.not 
favored by law, but on the contrary there is 
a strong public policy in favor of the free 
tra~sferability of property; and restraints 
thereon have been characterized as.obnoxious 
to public policy and void. • 73 C.J.S. 
Property, Section 13, page 195. 
11 
• All re-straints on alienation run 
counter to the policy of freedom of alien-
ation so that to be upheld they must in 
some way be justified.' Restatement, 
Property, Section 405, Comment. 
11 In the situation presented in this 
case there has been no adequate showing of 
purpose that the restra.l.nt on alienation 
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Was to Serve. " Brace vs Bla k S . c , upra. 
A more complete reading of the 
Restatement of Property reveals the following: 
Section 406, Indefeasible Possessory Estates 
in Fee Simple. 
f. Application---Restraints 
qualified only as to manner of 
alienation. If the full benefits 
which flow from the freedom to alienate 
what is or otherwise would be an 
indefeasible legal possessory estate 
in fee simple are to be obtained, the 
owner of such an estate must be able to 
take advantage of any of the existing 
methods of transferring property •. Any 
restraint which interferes with the 
power to alienat.e in some manner, 
though it leaves the owner of the 
estate free to alienate in other ways, 
places a substantial hindrance in the 
way of the disposition of the property 
and the-rule stated in this. section 
prevents ~uch interference. 
Illustrations: 
7. A owning Blackacre in fee 
simple absolute, makes an otherwise 
effective conveyance thereof "to B 
and his heirs, but if Blackacre is 
ever mortgaged, A or his heirs shall 
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have a right to re-enter and terminate 
the estate conveyed... The forfeiture . 
restraint on Blackacre which prohibits 
only mortgage is invalid. B has an 
undefeasible estate in fee simple. 
In essence the.restraint in the case at 
hand prohibited for all practical purposes 
the mortgaging of 'Mr. Bourgeois' property. 
And in Section 406, in n, pages 2412, 
2413 we read as follows: 
n. Application---Change in 
Circumstances. A restraint ~n the 
alienation of that which is or other-
wise would be an indefeasible legal 
possessory estate in fee simple which 
fails to satisfy the requirements of 
Clauses (a), (b). and (c) at the time 
of its creation is~invalid and is not 
made valid by a change in circumstances 
at any later date. If, however, the 
restraint at the time of its creation 
in the light of the circumstances 
which then exist, a change in circum-
stance which makes the enforcement of 
the restatement unreasonable renders 
it invalid. The restraint must not 
only be valid at its inception, but 
must pass the test for validity at the 
date when the enforcement of it is 
sought. 
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It is certainly evident that at the time 
Mr. Cummings attempted to take advantage of 
his right of first refusal, that the cir-
cumstances rendered the inforcement of the 
restraint unreasonable, and, thus, invalid. 
See also Maynard v~. Polhemus, 15 P 451; 
Falkenstein et. al. vs. Pipper~ California 
case, 183 P 2nd 707; Crecents vs. Vernier, 
204 P 2nd 785, 53 N.M. 185: in Hardy vs. 
Galloway, 15 Southeastern, 890, 111 N.c. 
519, wherein the grantor of land retained 
for himself and his heirs the.right to 
repurchase the larid when sold, and stipulated 
that, if the the grantee should sell or 
mortgage the land without giving grantor 
and his heirs the right to repurchase, the 
deed should be void. The condition was held 
bad as repugnant. See In.Re Roscher, 26 
Ch. D. 801; Tiffany, Volume 5 on Real Property, 
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Section 1345, page 166; Gray, Restraints of 
Alienation, Section 26, page 18. 
I The case in controversy is but a 
futile-effort of Mr. Cummings to control 
alienation,_which if recognized would result 
in unjust enrichm~nt to J. Buys Cummings and 
an injustic~ to the Plaintiff, Kamas State 
Bank, and Mr. Joe Bourgeois and his wife. 
III 
EVEN IF THE RESTRAINT HAD BEEN VALID, 
MR. J. BUYS CUMMINGS' REMEDY WOULD HAVE BEEN 
AGAINST JOE BOURGEOIS FOR INCUMBERING HIS 
LAND AND HE WOULD HAVE HAD TO RELY ON THE 
COVENANTS IN HIS WARRANTY DEED. 
In Knight vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
172 P -- 689, 693, •52 Utah 42 the Supreme 
Court of Utah states: "In view that it was 
shown that the option agreement was sub-
sequently merged into a·deed in which the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-113-
right of way was conveyed by plaintiff •..• 
held that plaintiff could rely upon the 
option agreement only for the purpose of 
showing consideration for putting in of the 
new crossing and the wire-wing fence •••• the 
Court's ruling, however, conforms to the 
doctrine that, where a written antecedent 
contract to convey real property is merged 
into a deed, the grantor ordinarily must 
rely on the covenants contained in the deed 
and cannot predicate a right of action upon 
an .antecedent contract ... And in Utah Savings 
and Trust Company vs. Stoutt, 102 P 865, 
867, 36 Utah 206, we read: 11Although it 
be conceded th~t Adeline Stoutt agreed to 
convey a marketable title in the contract of 
sale, yet, when the warranty deed was 
executed and delivered under which possession 
was given and taken, the contract of sale was 
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fully executed and its provisions were 
merged in the deed, and Fleishman thereafter 
was bound to rely upon the covenants in the 
deed, and if any breach occurred in any one 
of them he was required to sue and recover 
in a proper action for breach of such 
covenants. We think no case can be found, 
and counsel have cited none, where an action 
was based upon an executed contract of sale 
after such contract had been fully performed 
by the execution and delivery_of a deed and 
the vendee was given possession under i.t. 
The deed conveying the property sold by the 
contract is ordinarily-a complete execution 
of the contract of sale, and the covenants 
in the deed must thereafter be looked to 
for redress in case of defects in the title." 
And~in Reese Howell Company vs. Brown, 158 
p 684, 689, 48 Utah 142. our Court states, 
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"No rule of law is better settled than that, 
where a deed has been executed and accepted 
as performance of an executory contract to 
convey real estate, the contract is functus 
officio, and the rights of the parties rest 
thereafter solely on the deed. This is so 
although the deed thus accepted varies from 
that stipulated for in the contract, as where 
the vendee accepts the deed of a third party 
in lieu of the deed of his vendor; and as, 
in the sale$ of land, the law remits the 
party to his covenants in his deed, if there. 
be no ingredient of fraud or mistake in the 
case, and the party has not taken the pre-
caution to secure himself by covenants, he 
has no remedy for his money, even on failure 
of title." 
Mr. Cununings has no standing in a quiet 
title action against the Plaintiff, Kamas 
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/ 
State Bank, except to establish the amount 
of the lien. And if his title has failed, 
his recourse is on the covenants in his 
deed and not upon a pre-emptive right or 
right of first refusal which had not even 
bloomed into an_ option at the time Joe 
Bourgeois. encumbered his property with the 
lien created by the mortgage of Kamas State 
Bank. 
Other materials which may be. helpful 
are: 55 Am Jur 493, Section 27; 5 Am Jur 113j 
Section 8, 63; 55 Am Jur 506, Section 37; 
C.JoS., Vendor and Purchaser, Section 13, 
36 ALR, 1438 n., 162 ALR, 590 n., 596 n. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing Respondent respectful: 
submits that the lower court properly held 
as a matter of law that Respondent's 
mortgage was superior to any claim of J. Buys: 
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Cummings and Mary J. Cummings, his wife, for 
the following reasons: 
1. At the time the land was mortgaged, 
Mr. Cummings and his wife had no present 
interest in the land. 
2. Mr. Cummings' restraint on 
alienation was invalid as against public 
policy. 
3. Any possible claim that he might 
have on his pre-emption agreement would at 
most be confined to the covenants in his 
warranty deed. 
4. To make Mr. Cummings' claim superior 
to that of the Kamas State Bank would result 
in unjust enrichment to Mr. Cummings and 
wife and an injustice to Mr. Bourgeois and 
the Plaintiff, Kamas State Bank. 
n:; ~& --~ 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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